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Abstract
While statisticians and quantitative social scientists typically study the
“effects of causes” (EoC), Lawyers and the Courts are more concerned
with understanding the “causes of effects” (CoE). EoC can be addressed
using experimental design and statistical analysis, but it is less clear how
to incorporate statistical or epidemiological evidence into CoE reasoning,
as might be required for a case at Law. Some form of counterfactual rea-
soning, such as the “potential outcomes” approach championed by Rubin,
appears unavoidable, but this typically yields “answers” that are sensi-
tive to arbitrary and untestable assumptions. We must therefore recognise
that a CoE question simply might not have a well-determined answer. It is
nevertheless possible to use statistical data to set bounds within which any
answer must lie. With less than perfect data these bounds will themselves
be uncertain, leading to a compounding of different kinds of uncertainty.
Still further care is required in the presence of possible confounding fac-
tors. In addition, even identifying the relevant “counterfactual contrast”
may be a matter of Policy as much as of Science. Defining the question
is as non-trivial a task as finding a route towards an answer. This paper
develops some technical elaborations of these philosophical points, and
illustrates them with an analysis of a case study in child protection.
Keywords: benfluorex, causes of effects, counterfactual, child protec-
tion, effects of causes, Fre´chet bound, potential outcome, probability of
causation
1 Introduction
One function of a Court of Law is to attempt to assign responsibility or blame
for some undesirable outcome. In many such cases there will be relevant tes-
timony about statistical or epidemiological evidence arising from studies done
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on specialized populations, but this evidence addresses the main issue only in-
directly, at best. It has until now been unclear how to use such evidence to
focus on the issue at hand which involves specific individuals experiencing the
undesirable outcome. Although there is a considerable literature on certain
aspects of this problem—see for example Green et al. (2011), which aims to
assist US judges in managing cases involving complex scientific and technical
evidence—we consider that there are important logical subtleties that have not
as yet been accorded the appreciation they warrant. Here we show that, even in
the (very rare) case that we have the best possible and most extensive data on
the “effects of causes”, and can accept certain very strong but necessary con-
ditions, there will still remain irreducible uncertainty—which we can express
as interval bounds—about the relevant “probability of causation”. With less
than fully perfect data, this interval uncertainty will be further compounded by
statistical uncertainty. Such multiple forms of uncertainty raise subtle issues of
interpretation and presentation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In § 2 we consider a high-profile
case where serious side-effects led to the withdrawal of a drug from the market,
and, in turn, to litigation against the manufacturer. Since the evidence in this
litigation has yet to be presented formally at trial in court, we consider how
general evidence of incidence of effects might or might not be relevant to a
hypothetical tort action in which an affected patient sues the manufacturer for
damages, and we relate this to the distinction we draw in § 3 between “effects
of causes” and “causes of effects”. After a brief consideration of inference from
statistical data about effects of causes in § 4, the remainder of the paper focuses
on inference about causes of effects, based on a “probability of causation” defined
using counterfactual logic. Although this probability is typically impossible to
pinpoint on the basis of epidemiological data, however extensive, in § 5 we give
bounds between which it must lie—bounds which, however, will themselves be
subject to statistical uncertainty, which we discuss in § 6. In § 7 and § 8 we
illustrate our theory with a new analysis of a case study in child protection.
Section 9 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Epidemiological Evidence in Litigation
2.1 Epidemiological background
The drug Mediator, also known as benfluorex, was for many years marketed
as an anti-diabetic drug. It was also widely used off-label as an appetite sup-
pressant. In November 2010, however, following the publication of a popular
book by Ire`ne Frachon (2010), the French Health Agency CNAM announced
its finding that around 500 deaths in France over a thirty year period could be
attributed to Mediator—see also Hill (2011). This was based on extrapolation
of results in two scientific studies, published at about the same time, focusing on
the effects of benfluorex on valvular heart disease. Frachon et al. (2010) showed
a significantly higher prevalence of unexplained valvular heart disease in pa-
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tients taking benfluorex, as compared to controls. Weill et al. (2010) examined
the records of over a million diabetic patients in a cohort study, and reported a
higher hospitalisation rate for valvular heart disease in benfluorex takers.
2.2 Litigation
As the news about Mediator reverberated through the media, the French au-
thorities withdrew the drug from sale. At the same time, hundreds of individuals
jointly filed a criminal lawsuit against the manufacturer of Mediator, the French
pharmaceutical giant Les Laboratoires Servier. The trial has been under way
since May 2012, with initial aspects focused on whether the company was guilty
of misconduct. At the time of preparation of this article, the issue of whether
Mediator was in fact the cause of the heart disease in any of those who brought
the lawsuit had yet to be addressed, and no expert scientific testimony had
been presented to the court. As of September, 2014, however, the company has
agreed to compensate over 350 individual plaintiffs.1
In the US benfluorex was removed from the marketplace in the 1990s. The
banning in 1997 of a related drug, Redux, led to a $12 billion settlement, follow-
ing a class action by thousands of individuals (Anon 2010). Thus considerable
attention both in France and elsewhere is focused on the case against Servier.
2.3 Scientific results
The matched case-control study of Frachon et al. (2010) involved 27 cases of
valvular heart disease and 54 controls. Investigators determined whether the
patients had or had not used benfluorex.
We display the core data in Table 1. The face-value odds ratio in this table
is (19 × 51)/(3× 8) = 40.1, but this could be misleading because of confound-
ing factors2. A logistic regression analysis reported by Frachon et al. (2010)
adjusted for body mass index, diabetes and dexfenfluramine use, and reduced
the odds ratio to 17.1 (95% CI 3.5 to 83.0), a value which is still a large and
highly significant measure of positive association between benfluorex and valvu-
lar heart disease. In the same direction, Weill et al. (2010) computed a risk
ratio (though with relatively crude adjustments) of 3.1 (95% CI 2.4 to 4.0).
2.3.1 Robustness of odds ratio
While the risk ratio may be a more relevant and incisive measure of the strength
of an effect than the odds ratio (and it will feature importantly in our analysis of
§ 4 below), it faces a very serious problem: it is simply not possible to compute
it from a retrospective study, such as that of Frachon et al. (2010). In con-
trast, the odds ratio, whether raw or adjusted via a logistic regression, has the
1http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Sante/Mediator-350-victimes-indemnisees-685286#new-
reactions
2See Holland and Rubin (1988) for when it is necessary and appropriate to adjust for
covariate information in such a study.
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Benfluorex Use Cases Controls Totals
Yes 19 3 22
No 8 51 59
Totals 27 54 81
Table 1: Raw results from case-control study linking benfluorex and valvular
heart disease. Source: Frachon et al. (2010).
important property that it is simultaneously a meaningful measure of associa-
tion and computable from retrospective data (Altham 1970; Bishop et al. 1975;
Farewell 1979). Furthermore, under suitable adjustment for covariates it will be
a good approximation to the risk ratio when the outcome is rare.
2.4 Toxic tort—A hypothetical case
Now consider a (currently purely hypothetical) case that might be brought on
the basis of these scientific reports. A woman with unexplained valvular heart
disease sues the manufacturer of benfluorex, claiming that it was this that caused
her illness. An epidemiologist, testifying as expert witness for plaintiff, claims
that, on the evidence of Dr. Frachon’s and Dr. Weill’s studies, the medication can
cause valvular heart disease. Citing Nicot et al. (2011), who argued that “the
probabilistic information, derived from the available epidemiological studies,
needs to be considered as part of evidence to establish or refute a causal link
between benfluorex and valvular disease for a given patient”, this witness goes
on to claim that this is evidence for a causal link in the current case. The
defendants in turn proffer their expert, who testifies that in the manufacturer’s
clinical trials there was no evidence of such a side effect. How should the court
rule?
The court needs to decide on the cause of this woman’s heart disease. But the
plaintiff’s expert addresses something different, the general scientific question
“Can benfluorex be shown to cause heart disease?” For an epidemiologist, the
evidence for this would ideally be captured by the risk ratio, though, as we have
seen, for the Frachon data we would have to be satisfied with the adjusted odds
ratio instead. But even if we had perfect and unassailable statistical evidence
in support of this general scientific hypothesis, that would still be only very
indirectly relevant to the individual case at issue. We shall see below that the
relationship between such a generalisation and the specific issue before the court
is extremely subtle. For an extended discussion of the legal nexus of individual
causation and the “causes of effects”, see Dawid et al. (2014a).
3 Causes of Effects and Effects of Causes
One might be tempted to assume that the “effects of causes” (henceforth EoC)
and the “causes of effects” (CoE) are related probabilistically via Bayes theorem.
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After all, this was how Laplace (1986) introduced the topic: “If an event can
be produced by a number n of different causes, the probabilities of these causes
given the event are to each other as the probabilities of the event given the
causes,. . . ” Later authors recognized the issue to be more complex.
John Stuart Mill distinguished between inferences about effects of causes
and about causes of effects, and remarked “. . . as a general rule, the effects
of causes are far more accessible to our study than the causes of effects. . . ”
(Mill 1843, Book 3, Chapter 10, §8). Although a similar distinction has some-
times been expressed in statistical contexts (see e.g. Holland (1986)), Mill’s
associated warning has largely gone unheeded. We consider that it deserves
more careful attention. Though evidently related in some way, problems of
CoE are distinct from problems of EoC; indeed, as Mill understood, they are
considerably more subtle and difficult to handle.
In this article, which builds on and extends Dawid (2011) and Dawid et al. (2014a),
we attempt to delineate both the differences and the connexions between these
two distinct inferential enterprises. An understanding of these issues will clearly
be crucial if generic retrospective observational EoC evidence, such as that of
the Frachon et al. (2010) study, is to be brought to bear on an individual CoE
case, such as the toxic tort case of § 2.4. In particular we shall consider the
possibilities of using statistical evidence to inform CoE inferences.
3.1 Aspirin trial
As a simple concrete example, we contrast the following two questions:
Effects of Causes (EoC) Ann has a headache. She is wondering whether to
take aspirin. Would that cause her headache to disappear (within, say, 30
minutes)?
Causes of Effects (CoE) Ann had a headache and took aspirin. Her headache
went away after 30 minutes. Was that caused by the aspirin?
Note that—in a departure from previous related treatments—in both questions
we have separated out the roˆles of the subject (“Ann”), on whom we have
some information, and the questioner or analyst (henceforth “I”), who wants
to interpret that information: these could be the same individual, but need not
be. Any uncertainty about the answers to the above queries is my personal
uncertainty, and is most properly regarded as a subjective probability, though
informed by relevant data. This is somewhat analogous to the situation in
court, where we distinguish between a witness, who supplies evidence (e.g., on
epidemiology), and the trier of fact, be it a judge or a jury, who has to assess the
uncertainty to associate with the question of ultimate legal interest: the cause
of the effect.
What might be relevant data in the present instance? We suppose that a
well-conducted (large, prospective, randomised, double-blind,. . . ) comparative
clinical trial has indicated the following recovery rates:
Pr(R = 1 |E = 1) = 30% (1)
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Pr(R = 1 |E = 0) = 12% (2)
where E = 1 [resp., 0] denotes “exposure to” ( = treatment with) aspirin [resp.,
no aspirin], and R = 1 [resp., 0] denotes that the headache does [resp., does
not] disappear (within 30 minutes). Here and throughout, we use Pr(·) to
denote probabilities (henceforth termed chances) underlying a population data-
generating process.
4 Statistical Evidence for EoC
Ann has a headache. She is wondering whether to take as-
pirin. Would that cause her headache to disappear (within,
say, 30 minutes)?
Most of classical statistical experimental design and inference is geared to elu-
cidating the effects of causes, and much careful attention over many years has
gone into clarifying and improving methods for doing this, for example by the
use of randomised comparative experiments (Fisher 1935; Hill 1951) to control
for potential confounding factors. Even when emphasis is specifically targeted
on statistical causality (Rubin 1974; Holland and Rubin 1988; Pearl 2009) this
still mostly addresses EoC problems, albeit in observational rather than exper-
imental settings.
In order to highlight the major issue, we confine attention here to data from
a study, such as the aspirin trial of § 3.1, that can be regarded as supporting
genuinely causal inferences.3 In particular, for the aspirin trial this would mean
that—so long as I can regard Ann as being comparable with the patients in
the trial—if she takes aspirin I can expect her headache to disappear within 30
minutes with probability 30%, but with probability only 12% if she does not.
If I myself am Ann, then (other things being equal) taking the aspirin is my
preferred option.
In this case, the EoC causal inference is based on a simple contrast be-
tween the two “prospective” conditional probabilities, Pr(R = 1 |E = 1) and
Pr(R = 1 |E = 0). In particular, the information needed for making EoC causal
inferences—and so for guiding future decisions—is subsumed in the conditional
probability distribution of the response R given exposure E. In more com-
plex situations we may have to make various modifications, e.g. adjustment for
covariates, but the essential point remains that purely probabilistic knowledge,
properly conditioned on known facts, is sufficient to address EoC-type questions.
5 Statistical Evidence for CoE
Ann had a headache and took aspirin. Her headache went
away after 30 minutes. Was that caused by the aspirin?
3Some considerations relevant to the possibilities for causal inference in various data-
collection settings can be found in Dawid (2011).
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5.1 How to Understand “Causes of Effects”?
Addressing a CoE-type question is much more problematic—indeed, even to
formulate the question clearly is a nontrivial enterprise. We can no longer base
our approach purely on the probability distribution of E and R conditioned on
known facts, since we know the values of both variables (E = 1, R = 1), and
after conditioning on that knowledge there is no probabilistic uncertainty left
to work with.
One possible approach, popular in statistical circles, is based on the con-
cept of the “counterfactual contrast”, which in turn rests on the introduction
of “potential responses” (Rubin 1974). We proceed by splitting the response
variable R into two variables, R0 and R1, where we conceive of R1 [resp., R0]
as a potential value of R, that will eventuate if in fact E = 1 [resp., 0]. Both
these potential responses are regarded as existing prior to the determination of
E. We thus now need to model the three variables (E,R0, R1) together, rather
than (as previously) just the two variables (E,R).4
We might now cast the CoE question as enquiring about the relationship
between R0 and R1. Thus “R1 = 1, R0 = 0” describes the situation where
Ann’s headache disappears if she takes the aspirin, but does not if she does
not—a state of affairs that might reasonably be described as the disappearance
of Ann’s headache being caused by taking the aspirin. In particular, if Ann has
taken the aspirin and her headache disappeared (thus R1 = 1), these two events
can be regarded as causally connected just in the case that R0 = 0.
5.2 Science and Policy
Although we shall follow through with the above formulation in the remainder
of this article, we here turn aside to consider an objection to it: it simply
might not be appropriate to regard, as the “counterfactual foil” to the factual
response (R1), what would have happened (R0) if the exposure had not occurred
(E = 0) but all other prior circumstances were the same. For example, there has
been a series of legal cases in which various administrations have sued tobacco
companies on the basis that they had not properly informed the public of the
dangers of smoking when they first had that evidence, and should therefore
be liable for the increased costs that fell on health services due to that act
of omission. But it could be argued that, since smokers tend to die earlier
than non-smokers, encouraging (or at least not discouraging) smoking would
in fact reduce the total burden on the health services. Such an attempted
defence has, however, usually been ruled inadmissible. Instead, as a matter
of policy, the relevant counterfactual comparator is taken to be a hypothetical
universe in which every one lives just as long as they do in fact, but they are
healthier because they smoke less. Here we see Science and Policy as inextricably
intertwined in formulating the appropriate CoE question. And the conceptual
and implementational difficulties that we discuss below, that beset even the
4The observed response R is determined by these three variables as R = RE .
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simplest case of inference about causes of effects, will be hugely magnified when
we wish to take additional account of such policy considerations.
5.3 Statistical Evidence
After the above detour, we return to our formulation of the CoE question, in
terms of a contrast between R1, the actually observed response (in this case,
R1 = 1) to the treatment actually taken (E = 1), and R0, the (necessarily
unknown) counterfactual response, that would have been observed had Ann
in fact not taken the aspirin. If “in counterfact” R0 = 1, then Ann’s headache
would have disappeared even if she had not taken the aspirin, so I must conclude
that it was not the aspirin that cured her. Conversely, if R0 = 0 then I can
indeed attribute her cure to having taken the aspirin. In this way, we formulate
the CoE causal question in terms of the contrast between the factual outcome
R1 and the counterfactual outcome R0.
To address the CoE question I thus need to query R0. Since R0 has not
been observed, it retains a degree of uncertainty, which I could try to express
probabilistically. However, not only have I not observed R0, there is, now, no
way I could ever observe it, since once I have observed R1, R0 has becomes a
counterfactual quantity, predicated on a condition (E = 0) that is counter to
known facts (E = 1). This logical difficulty leads to a degree of unavoidable
ambiguity affecting our ability to address the CoE question.
In evaluating my probabilistic uncertainty, I should condition on all I know.
My full knowledge about Ann can be expressed as (E = 1, R1 = 1, H), where H
denotes all the background knowledge I have about Ann, and the other variables
are likewise individualised to her. With this understanding, we formally define
my PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION as the conditional probability:
PCA = PA(R0 = 0 |H,E = 1, R1 = 1) (3)
where PA denotes my probability distribution over attributes of Ann.
But how can I go about evaluating PCA, and what other evidence could be
used, and how, to inform this evaluation? In particular, how—if at all—could
I make use of EoC probabilities such as (1) and (2) to assist my evaluation of
the CoE probability (3)?
5.4 Bounding the probability of causation
We note that (3) involves a joint distribution of (R0, R1). Since, as a matter of
definition, it is never possible to observe both R0 and R1 on the same individual,
it is problematic to estimate such a joint distribution. We might however have
a hope of assessing separate marginal probabilities for R0 and R1; and this
information can be used to set bounds on PC. Indeed it is straightforward to
show (cf. Dawid (2011)):
min
{
1,
PA(R0 = 0 |H,E = 1)
PA(R1 = 1 |H,E = 1)
}
≥ PCA ≥ max
{
0, 1−
1
RRA
}
, (4)
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where
RRA :=
PA(R1 = 1 |H,E = 1)
PA(R0 = 1 |H,E = 1)
. (5)
Readers will recognize (4) as a version of the Bonferroni-Fre´chet-Hoeffding
bounds (Bonferroni 1936; Fre´chet 1940; Hoeffding 1940) that play important
roˆles in other areas of statistics such as in the study of copulas.
The inequality (4) will yield a non-trivial lower bound so long as RRA > 1,
which we can interpret as saying that there is a positive causal effect of expo-
sure on outcome: cf. the related argument in Robins and Greenland (1989a).
Whenever RRA exceeds 2, we can deduce from (9), without making any further
assumptions, that PCA must exceed 50%. In a civil legal case such as that of
§ 2.4, causality might then be concluded “on the balance of probabilities”. It
is however important to note (see Robins and Greenland (1989b)) that, when
RRA < 2, it would not be correct to conclude from this that PCA < 50% (which
would lead to the case failing); rather, we can only say that we can not be sure
that the probability of causation exceeds 50%.
The upper bound in (4) is more subtle. It is less than 1 when PA(R0 =
1 |H,E = 1) + PA(R1 = 1 |H,E = 1) > 1. This happens in general only when
both Ann’s potential outcomes have a substantial probability of taking value 1.
If PA(R1 = 1 |H,E = 1) = PA(R = 1 |H,E = 1) is only modest in size, e.g.,
less than 1/2 and RRA > 1, then the upper bound is 1. If RRA is large, e.g.,
RRA > 10, the upper bound will again be 1 unless PA(R = 1 |H,E = 1) is close
to 1. For the remainder of the paper, for simplicity we proceed using an upper
bound of 1. Thus we work with the bounds
1 ≥ PCA ≥ max
{
0, 1−
1
RRA
}
(6)
with RRA given by (5).
5.5 The risk ratio
Expression (3) and the denominator of (5) involve a counterfactual considera-
tion: of R0, Ann’s potential response were she not to have taken the aspirin,
in the situation that she is known to have taken aspirin (E = 1). So it would
seem problematic to attempt to identify these quantities from data. However,
if my background knowledge H of Ann (on which my distribution PA is being
conditioned) is sufficiently detailed, then, at the point before Ann has decided
whether or not to take the aspirin, it might seem appropriate to consider that
my uncertainty, conditional on H , about the way her treatment decision E will
be made would not further depend on the (so far entirely unobserved) potential
responses (R0, R1). That is, in this case we might assume
(R0, R1)⊥⊥AE |H (7)
where ⊥⊥A denotes conditional independence (Dawid 1979) in my distribution
PA for Ann’s characteristics. When (7) holds we will term the background
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information H sufficient . Then (3) becomes
PCA = PA(R0 = 0 |H,R1 = 1) (8)
and in the lower bound in (6) we can replace (5) by
RRA =
PA(R1 = 1 |H)
PA(R0 = 1 |H)
, (9)
my causal risk ratio for Ann.5
Sufficiency is a kind of “no confounding” requirement on my distribution PA
for Ann (see for instance Dawid (2014)). It would fail if, for example, I thought
that Ann might take the treatment if she felt really poorly, and not otherwise;
but I did not initially have information as to how she felt. Then observing
that she took the treatment (E = 1) would inform me that she was feeling
poorly, so decreasing the probability of a good response (whether actual, R1, or
counterfactual, R0). Now if I myself am Ann, my H will already include my own
knowledge of my perceived state of health, so this argument does not apply, and
sufficiency is an acceptable condition. If I am an external observer, however, the
sufficiency condition is much more problematic, since I must be able to satisfy
myself that my knowledge H of Ann is complete enough to avoid the above
possibility of confounding. If I can not assume sufficiency, I can not replace the
counterfactual denominator of (5) by anything even potentially estimable from
data.
Note that the “no confounding” property of sufficiency relates solely to Ann
and my knowledge of her. It should not be confused with the superficially
similar no confounding property of exogeneity described in § 5.6 below, which
refers, not to Ann, but to the process whereby possibly relevant data on other
individuals have been gathered.
5.6 Estimating the risk ratio
Henceforth we assume sufficiency, which at least gets us started, and we aim
to see what further progress can be made, and under what conditions, to get a
handle on the bounds on PCA supplied by RRA. It is important to be explicit
about the assumptions required, which can be very strong and not easy to
justify!
It would be valuable if the probabilities featuring in (5) could be related
in some way to chances such as (1) and (2) that are estimable from data.
Consider first the numerator, the Ann-specific probability PA(R1 = 1 |H,E =
1) = PA(R = 1 |H,E = 1). It is tempting to replace this by the analogous
chance, Pr(R = 1 |H,E = 1), which could be estimated from data as for (1),
5We can derive (9)–though not (8)–from the weaker condition that replaces the joint prop-
erty (7) by the two marginal properties Rj⊥⊥AE |H, j = 0, 1. Since we are only concerned
with bounds in this paper, that weaker condition would be adequate for our purposes. How-
ever, we find it hard to imagine circumstances where we would be willing to accept the weaker
but not the stronger condition, so will continue to use conditions like (7).
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based on the subset of treated trial subjects sharing the same H-value as Ann.6
This would be justified if we could make the following bold assumption (where
Bayesians can replace the intuitive term “comparable” with the more precise
term “exchangeable”):
Condition 5.1 Conditional on my knowledge of the pre-treatment characteris-
tics of Ann and the trial subjects, I regard Ann’s potential responses as compa-
rable with those of the treated subjects having characteristic H.
Up to this point we have not needed the assumption that H is sufficient. But
consider now the denominator of (4). Because of its counterfactual nature,
we can not argue directly as above. However, with sufficiency of H we have
PA(R0 = 1 |H,E = 1) = PA(R0 = 1 |H,E = 0) = PA(R = 1 |H,E = 0); and
we can estimate this from the clinical trial data, e.g. as the estimated chance
Pr(R = 1 |H,E = 0), if we can assume:
Condition 5.2 Conditional on my knowledge of the pre-treatment characteris-
tics of Ann and the trial subjects, I regard Ann’s potential responses as compa-
rable with those ot the untreated subjects having characteristic H.
Now if both Condition 5.1 and Condition 5.2 are to hold, then (by Euclid’s
first axiom, “Two things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to each
other”), the groups of trial subjects with Ann’s characteristics H in both arms
must be comparable with each other. This requires that H be exogenous , in the
sense that, conditional on H , the potential outcomes (R0, R1) have the same
distribution among treated and untreated study subjects. This will hold for a
suitably randomised study, and also in certain observational studies where the
possibility of further confounding factors can be discounted.
Note however that we can not take, asH , just any exogenous set of variables.
The full set of required conditions is:
1. H is exogenous.
2. H is sufficient for Ann’s response.
3. Conditional on H , Ann’s potential responses are comparable with those
of the trial subjects.
We will refer to this set of conditions as the fundamental conditions .
When we can make good arguments for the acceptability of these fundamen-
tal conditions, equation (3) becomes
PCA = Pr(R0 = 0 |H,R1 = 1), (10)
6Alternatively, the estimate might be constructed from a model for the dependence of the
response R on H and E = 1, fitted to all the data, and applied with Ann’s value of H. We
might also be able to reduce to a smaller information set H, if that is all that is relevant for
prediction of the responses.
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and, in the lower bound in (4), we can identify RRA with the population coun-
terpart of (9), the observational risk ratio:
ORR :=
Pr(R = 1 |H,E = 1)
Pr(R = 1 |H,E = 0)
. (11)
Now that we have made clear that the fundamental conditions can be ex-
pected to hold only in special circumstances, when they will require detailed
justification, we shall henceforth confine ourselves to futher consideration of
just these special cases. In particular we shall accept (10), and RRA = ORR as
in (11). So we will use the bounds
1 ≥ PC ≥ max
{
0, 1−
1
ORR
}
(12)
with ORR given by (11). (Here and henceforth, unless the context requires
otherwise we drop the identifier A on PC: these bounds will apply to any
individual for whom the fundamental conditions hold.)
5.7 An alternative approach
Our probability of causation, PCA given by (3), is essentially the same as what
Pearl (2009) terms the “Probability of Necessity” (PN). Tian and Pearl (2000)
take an alternative approach to supplying bounds for PN, based on data and
assumptions different from ours. In particular, they drop our requirement that
H be sufficient for Ann’s response, requiring instead the availability of two sets
of data on individuals comparable to Ann: one set in which treatment was (or
can be regarded as) randomized, and another in which it arose “naturally” in the
same way as for Ann. Because of these differences it is not in general possible
to compare their bounds and ours. See Pearl (2014); Dawid et al. (2014b) for
further discussion of these issues.
5.8 Uncertain exposure
So far we have supposed we know both the fact of exposure (E = 1) and the
fact of response (R = 1), the only uncertainty being about whether there was a
causal link between these two facts. There are other situations where we might
observe the response, and wonder whether it was caused by exposure, without
knowing with certainty whether or not that exposure had in fact taken place.
In such cases we have to multiply the probability of causation PCA by the
probability of exposure, conditional on the known fact of a positive response,
yielding a modified probability of causation:
PC∗A = PCA × PA(E = 1 |H,R = 1). (13)
In particular, under the fundamental conditions, combining this with (12)
delivers the inequalities
Pr(E = 1 |H,R = 1) ≥ PC∗ ≥ max
{
0, 1−
Pr(E = 0 |H,R = 1)
Pr(E = 0 |H)
}
. (14)
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6 Statistical Uncertainty
Our discussion so far has treated estimates, such as those in (1) and (2), as if
they were the true values of the chances. Even so, we found that we obtain, at
best, only partial CoE information, which confines PC or PC∗ to an interval but
does not yield a point value. In real applications our data will not be extensive
enough to give us pinpoint estimates of even the bounds featuring in the in-
equality formulae (12) or (14), and so we have to take additional account of the
resulting statistical uncertainty. The result of our inference is thus an uncertain
interval within which a probability (PC or PC∗) must lie—thus compounding
three different kinds of uncertainty.
Statistical uncertainty, at least, is well studied, and can be expressed and
understood in a variety of different ways, as touted and debated by the var-
ious competing schools of statistical inference. The generic problem of infer-
ence for a quantity (like PC) that, being only partly identified by the data, is
subject to interval bounds, has been treated from both a classical perspective
(Manski 2003; Manski 2007; Vansteelandt et al. 2006) and a Bayesian perspec-
tive (Greenland 2005; Greenland 2009; Gustafson 2005; Gustafson 2009), but
these approaches usually involve adding assumptions or data via model expan-
sion and are not directly applicable here.
We here take a Bayesian approach, to derive a joint posterior probability
distribution (which, following the helpful terminology of Best et al. (2013), we
henceforth term a credence distribution) for the estimable unknown chances in
the problem.
One possible Bayesian tactic would be to assign a prior distribution to the
multivariate parameter, φ say, comprising the chances assigned to the four con-
figurations of (R0, R1) conditioned on H . Under the fundamental conditions,
PCA is a function of φ, given by (10), so that a Bayesian analysis, based on
such a prior, would deliver a fully determined posterior distribution for PCA.
However, this is problematic: because R0 and R1 are never simultaneously ob-
servable, these joint chances can not be consistently estimated from data, so that
this “inference” remains highly sensitive to the specific prior assumptions made,
however extensive the data. Alternatively put, the parameter φ describing the
joint distribution of (R0, R1) (given H) is not fully identifiable from data; at
best, only the parameter, λ say (a non-invertible function of φ), determining
the associated marginal distributions of R0 and R1, is identifiable. Then λ is a
sufficient parameter (Barankin 1960). For extensive data (and a non-dogmatic
prior), the posterior distribution of λ will converge to a point mass at its true
value, but the posterior conditional distribution of φ given λ will be exactly the
same in the posterior as in the prior (Kadane 1974; Dawid 1979). In particular
the marginal posterior distribution of any non-identifiable function of φ will be
non-degenerate, and highly dependent on the form of the conditional prior for
φ given λ (Gustafson 2005; Gustafson 2009; Gustafson 2012).
For these reasons, we prefer to assign a joint credence distribution for the
(estimable) marginal chances alone: given sufficient data, of sufficiently good
quality, these will be well estimated and insensitive to prior assumptions. The
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price of this increased statistical precision, however, is logical imprecision, since
from even perfect knowledge of these chances we can at best derive interval
inequalities for PC or PC∗. Thus our inference has the form of a random interval
asserted to contain PC or PC∗.
6.1 Group or individual inference?
In the above approach, we considered the probabilities featuring in the inequal-
ities (12) and (14) as “objective chances”, which we might interpret as limiting
relative frequencies computed in an appropriate groups of exchangeable individ-
uals. We focused on the posterior joint credence distribution of these chances,
given the available statistical data D—thus giving rise to a random uncertainty
interval for the probability of causation, itself regarded as an objective chance.
We refer to this as the “group-focused” approach.
Another approach to using data to inform the inference about PC or PC∗ is
to regard these concepts, and the probabilities featuring in the bounds for them,
themselves as credences, quantifying numerically the relevant uncertainty about
attributes of the specific individual, Ann, on whom we are focusing. This is the
“individual-focused” approach. For an interchange on these issues and “group-
to-individual” inference, see the discussion by Dawid and the authors’ rejoinder
in Best et al. (2013).
In the individual-focused formulation, the term Pr(E = 0 |H,R = 1) in (14),
for example, would be replaced by PA(EA = 0 |HA, RA = 1, D), where the
suffix A refers to attributes of Ann. We now obtain a non-random uncertainty
interval for PCA (or PC
∗
A)—but one that is computed in the light of the available
evidence, and would be likely to change were further data to become available.
To continue with this example, let ψ denote the chance Pr(E = 0 |H,R = 1).
If the individuals in D can be regarded as exchangeable with Ann, and we
interpret ψ as a limiting relative frequency in this exchangeable setting, we will
have:
PA(EA = 0 |HA, RA = 1, D) = E {PA(EA = 0 |HA, RA = 1, ψ) |HA, RA = 1, D}
= E(ψ |HA, RA = 1, D) . (15)
Often, given the data D, the further conditioning in (15) on the Ann-specific
information (HA, RA = 1) will have negligible effect—in which case the desired
Ann-specific probability PA(EA = 0 |HA, RA = 1, D) can be approximated by
the posterior expectation (i.e., conditioned onD alone) of the conditional chance
ψ = Pr(E = 0 |H,R = 1). A similar argument applies to any other required
credences in the problem.
6.2 Additional issues
All our above analysis is predicated on the causal relevance of the epidemiolog-
ical data, assuming that we can use the study to obtain a sound estimate of
the causal risk ratio RRA that features in (5). For example, in a simple fully
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randomised study we could use ORR, as given by (11), as a proxy for RR. But
such studies are the exception in epidemiology, so that the issues in real world
settings where interest is focused on the causes of effects are typically much more
complex. Thus in the benfluorex example of § 2, using the frequencies in Table 1
for this purpose, by plugging them into the formula for ORR and interpreting
this as RR, would be totally misleading, even if we attempted to account for sta-
tistical uncertainty as described above. Indeed, as we noted in Section 2, there
are additional problems in this case: because the study of Frachon et al. (2010)
was retrospective, and the frequencies in Table 1 could not be used to estimate
ORR, even in the absence of confounding. And this problem remains when,
admitting the likely existence of confounding, we conduct a more sophisticated
analysis—such as the multiple logistic regression that produced the adjusted
odds ratio—to try and account for it. Even when this ploy can be regarded as
successful, still the best we can ever do with retrospective data is to estimate
the causal odds ratio—which will approximate the desired causal risk ratio, as
required for setting the lower bound on PC, only when the outcome is rare.
The judge in the hypothetical case we pose should therefore be doubly wary
of the relevance of the epidemiological evidence when trying to assess whether
the drug caused the plaintiff’s heart disease.
There are even more complex situations where the data are retrospective
and where there are multiple outcomes of interest and multiple time points for
their assessment. A notable example comes from the continuing effort in the
United States to examine the long-term health effects of exposure to Agent Or-
ange among US Vietnam veterans. From 1962 to 1971, the US military sprayed
herbicides over Vietnam. In 1991 the US Congress passed the Agent Orange
Act, requiring a comprehensive evaluation of scientific and medical information
regarding the health effects of exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides
used in Vietnam: Institute of Medicine (2011) is the eighth biennial update im-
plementing this Congressional mandate. The report examines epidemiological
studies of the health status of veterans considering a multiplicity of deleterious
effects, e.g., different forms of cancer and early-onset peripheral neuropathy,
and with limited information on exposure, both at the aggregate and individual
level. A standard tool in the studies incorporated into this regularly-updated as-
sessment is the use of adjusted odds-ratios from retrospective logistic regression
analyses. Identification of a substantial RR triggers compensation to veterans
for health and disability outcomes associated with putative exposure.
7 Case Study
We illustrate our analysis with an example taken from Best et al. (2013). The
motivating real life case was the diagnosis of abuse in an infant child, c, present-
ing with an acute life threatening event (“ALTE”). So now we take exposure,
E = 1, to denote abuse, and response, R = 1 to denote ALTE.
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7.1 Three tasks
We can distinguish three tasks that we might wish to address probabilistically
concerning the relationship between exposure and response in this individual
case; these are quite distinct and should not be confused—although there are
of course relationships (far from trivial) between them.
Forecasting If the child is abused, what is the probability the child will suffer
ALTE — Pc(ALTE | abuse)?
Backcasting If the child suffers ALTE, what is the probability the child was
abused? — Pc(abuse |ALTE)?
Attribution If the child suffers ALTE, what is the probability this was caused
by abuse?
In the above, we have used Pc to indicate my probabilities for this child (im-
plicitly conditioned on the background information H I have about the child).
Even so, we have a choice between taking a group-focused approach, in which
Pc is interpreted as an uncertain chance, relevant to a group of individuals of
which this child is one; or an individual-focused approach, with Pc denoting
my credence about this specific child. We start by taking the group-focused
approach: the individual-focused approach will be considered in § 8.3.
7.2 Attribution analysis
Best et al. (2013) focused on the backcasting task: of assessing whether or not
abuse has in fact taken place, based on the data on the individual case and on
relevant statistical studies. Their analysis directly addressed the main substan-
tive concern, since it was the occurrence of abuse—whether or not it in fact
caused the observed signs—that was at issue. They did not need to enquire
whether or not the observed signs were caused by abuse. That attribution ques-
tion however will be our focus here. We note that, since the very fact of abuse
is itself uncertain, we also need to consider the backcasting issue. This is done
by taking, as the relevant probabilistic target of our inference, the modified
probability of causation PC∗, as given by (13).
We have described in § 5.3 the many very strong assumptions that have to be
made in order to justify using data to estimate even the weak interval bounds of
(14) for PC∗. In the present example, the data used by Best et al. (2013) were
gleaned from a search for relevant published studies. Those identified were of
varying design and quality, and the data extracted from them can in no sense
be regarded as supporting genuine causal inferences — indeed, it is not easy to
find real examples where the conditions supporting causal inference of this type
could be regarded as satisfied. Purely for illustration we shall proceed as if they
are, so that we can use the inequalities of (14). As a further—admittedly highly
unrealistic—assumption, we take the sufficient information H to be trivial. All
these imperfections in the data, and in our understanding of the context, mean
that our analysis must not be taken as delivering a credible conclusion in this
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particular application; however, we hope that, by following it through in detail,
we may help to clarify the points to which attention should given when analysing
any similar problem.
Using a Gibbs sampler implemented in theWinBUGS c© software (Lunn et al. 2012),
Best et al. (2013) find the posterior credence distributions for various condi-
tional chances, based on the data.7 In particular, they obtain the posterior
credence distribution for the conditional chance Pr(E = 1 |R = 1), and thus for
Pr(E = 0 |R = 1) = 1− Pr(E = 1 |R = 1), as needed on both sides of (14).
For our purposes, however, we need more: the lower bound for PC∗ in (14)
also involves the marginal prior chance Pr(E = 0)—or, essentially equivalently,
θ := Pr(E = 1), the chance of abuse having taken place (in this individual
case), before the evidence of ALTE is taken into consideration. And there is no
available statistical evidence relevant to this quantity.
We therefore proceed by introducing our own prior credence distribution for
θ, and treating this chance as independent of all the others in the problem.
We can expect considerable sensitivity to the specific choice made. To begin to
explore this, we try two different prior credence distributions for θ, both beta
distributions for simplicity and tractability:
Prior 1: θ ∼ β(0.1, 0.1).
This has mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.46. It can be regarded as
representing very substantial prior uncertainty about θ.
Prior 2: θ ∼ β(1, 9).
This has mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.09. While still admitting
uncertainty, it attempts to take into account the prior unlikelihood of
abuse: its mean 0.1 is the unconditional probability assigned to this event.
Density functions of these two prior credence distributions are displayed in
Figure 1.
We note that the lower bound in (14) is 0 if and only if RRA ≤ 1, which
event is independent of θ. Consequently the posterior probability that the lower
bound is 0 is unaffected by the assumptions made about the prior distribution
for θ—as similarly is the conditional posterior distribution of the upper bound,
given that the lower bound is 0.
8 Data Analysis
We have conducted our own analysis of the data, based on the WinBUGS code
of Best et al. (2013) elaborated so as to incorporate θ. After a burn-in phase
of 500000 iterations, to get rid of autocorrelation we have based the estimates
7Best et al. (2013) conduct several alternative analyses, with some of the less reliable data
values being either included or excluded. Our own analysis is based on the predictive model
and data in the combined WinBUGS code of Appendices B and D of their paper, as for their
own Table 4. This analysis targets a case-specific chance, having greater relevance, but also
more uncertainty, than the overall population-based chance.
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0
2
4
6
8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
(b) Prior 2: θ ∼ β(1, 9)
Figure 1: Two prior credence distributions for θ, the prior chance that abuse
has taken place.
on thinned samples taking every 10th elements of the chain. Then we have
considered a chain of length 50000.
8.1 Bivariate distribution
A complete inference would describe the posterior credence distribution of the
uncertainty interval (14) for PC∗, whose end-points are functions of random
chances, and hence themselves have a bivariate distribution.
Note that, whenever the inequality Pr(E = 1 |R = 1) ≤ Pr(E = 1) between
chances holds, which corresponds to negative association between exposure and
outcome and will happen with positive probability in the posterior credence
distribution, the lower bound of the uncertainty interval is 0 and is thus en-
tirely uninformative. Thus the posterior credence distribution is a mixture of
a continuous bivariate distribution, and (with positive probability) a distribu-
tion for the upper bound alone. The probability that the lower bound of the
uncertainty interval is 0 (which is independent of the prior distribution used) is
estimated as 0.65. Figure 2 displays, for the two different priors, samples from
the bivariate posterior credence distribution (ordered by lower bound). In the
plots are reported 100 uncertainty intervals obtained by selecting one iteration
of the chain every 500.
In Figure 3 are shown bivariate contour plots, for Priors 1 and 2, of the end-
points of the random uncertainty interval, excluding those cases where the lower
bound is equal to zero. The full joint distribution is completed by specifying
the distribution of the upper bound for these cases. This distribution, which
is independent of the assumed prior for θ, is shown in Figure 4, which can also
be interpreted as displaying the conditional distribution of the length of the
uncertainty interval for PC∗, given that its lower bound is 0.
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Figure 2: For each of the priors of Figure 1, 100 uncertainty intervals, randomly
sampled from the bivariate posterior distribution of the lower and upper bounds,
are displayed. The intervals are ordered in increasing value of the lower bound.
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Figure 3: For each of the priors of Figure 1, a contour plot of the joint posterior
distribution of the lower and upper bounds of the random uncertainty interval,
conditional on the lower bound being positive.
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Figure 4: The posterior density of the upper bound of the random uncertainty
interval, conditional on the lower bound being 0. This distribution is indepen-
dent of the chosen prior for the parameter θ.
8.2 Univariate summaries
Useful univariate summaries of the overall bivariate inference are the marginal
posterior credence distributions of the upper and lower bounds, and of the length
of the uncertainty interval.
8.2.1 Upper bound
The upper bound Pr(E = 1 |R = 1) in (14) is the chance of abuse given the
case evidence of ALTE, as already considered by Best et al. (2013). Its poste-
rior credence distribution (which is unaffected by the choice of prior for θ) is
summarised in the second row of Table 4 of Best et al. (2013). We compute the
posterior mean and standard deviation for this upper bound to be 0.043 and
0.013, respectively. Its posterior density is shown in Figure 5.
8.2.2 Lower bound
The lower bound on PC∗ in (14), max{0, 1 − Pr(E = 0 |R = 1)/Pr(E = 0)},
depends also on θ = Pr(E = 1), and its posterior credence distribution could
be sensitive to the prior credence distribution chosen for θ. We have already
noted that the posterior credence probability that the lower bound is 0 is 0.65,
independent of the prior for θ. Figure 6 displays the posterior densities for the
lower bound, conditional on its being strictly positive, for Prior 1 and Prior 2;
the means are 0.039 and 0.025, and the standard deviations are 0.015 and 0.016,
respectively. We see that the effects of the differences between the priors are
relatively minor.
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Figure 5: The posterior credence density of the upper bound for PC∗. This
distribution is independent of the chosen prior for the parameter θ.
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Figure 6: For each of the priors of Figure 1, the posterior credence density of
the lower bound for PC∗, conditional on this being greater than 0.
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8.2.3 Length of interval
Another useful summary of the full inference is the posterior credence distribu-
tion of the length of the interval between the lower and upper bounds on PC∗,
as displayed in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: For each of the priors of Figure 1, the posterior credence density of
the length of the uncertainty interval for PC∗.
The posterior mean and standard deviation based on Prior 1 are, respec-
tively, 0.028 and 0.022, while for Prior 2 these quantities are 0.035 and 0.016.
We see high sensitivity to the prior assumptions. This is particularly apparent
when we exclude data with lower bound equal to zero (see Figure 8). For cases
with lower bound equal to 0, the interval length is identical with the upper
bound, as displayed in Figure 4, and is independent of the prior distribution for
θ. These features are also visible in Figure 2.
8.2.4 Coverage probability
Finally, for any probability value p, we can compute the posterior credence that
this is included in the random interval (14)—and thus is at least a candidate as
a value for PC∗. We graph this coverage measure, as a function of p, in Figure 9
for both priors.
8.3 Individual-focused inference
The individual-focused inference is much simpler in form: according to the
analysis in § 6.1 (and assuming the approximation mentioned there is valid), we
simply replace the chances featuring in the bounds of (14) by their posterior
expectations. (Recall that we are taking H to be trivial, so it can be omitted
from the notation).
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Figure 8: For each of the priors of Figure 1, the pposterior credence density of
the length of the uncertainty interval for PC∗, conditional on the lower bound
being greater than 0.
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Figure 9: For each of the priors of Figure 1, the posterior credence probability
that the random uncertainty interval covers any specific value.
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The posterior expectation of the upper bound, Pr(E = 1 |R = 1), is 0.043,
independent of the assumed prior distribution for θ.
As for the lower bound, the posterior expectation of Pr(E = 0 |R = 1)
is 1 − 0.043 = 0.957. Also, Pr(E = 0) = 1 − θ, and since we have no data
relevant to θ the posterior expectation of this quantity is the same as its prior
expectation, namely 0.5 for Prior 1, or 0.9 for Prior 2. It is clear that there
could be high sensitivity to the prior distribution assessed for θ. However, in
this case the lower bound is 0 for both priors. Hence our individual-focused
uncertainty interval for PC∗ is (0, 0.043) in both cases.
9 Conclusions
We have seen that statistical inference about “causes of effects” is particularly
problematic from many points of view, and difficult to justify even in ideal
circumstances.
First, in order merely to formalise the question, we need to carefully specify,
separately, both who is making the inference (in § 5.3 we called that person“I”)
and who (there called “Ann”) the inference relates to. Next, we need to be sat-
isfied that my information H about Ann is sufficient , in the sense of there being
no confounding that could make Ann’s treatment choice informative (for me)
about her potential outcome variables. When all these conditions are satisfied
we can begin to try and learn from relevant data about the two versions, PC
and PC∗, of the probability of causation. For that purpose we should have good
experimental data from which we can get good estimates of the distribution
of the outcome, conditional on exposure E and H . And even with such ideal
estimated probabilities, the resulting inferences are complex, compounding as
they do three different kinds of uncertainty: interval bounds, for a probability,
that are themselves random. We have made a start at exploring ways of under-
standing, describing and displaying such triple uncertainty (in an example that
admittedly falls far short of the ideal situation), but much remains to be done.
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